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ABSTRACT 
There has been much discussion of the “right to explanation” in the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation, and its existence, merits, and 
disadvantages. Implementing a right to explanation that opens the ‘black 
box’ of algorithmic decision-making faces major legal and technical 
barriers. Explaining the functionality of complex algorithmic decision-
making systems and their rationale in specific cases is a technically 
challenging problem. Some explanations may offer little meaningful 
information to data subjects, raising questions around their value. Data 
controllers have an interest to not disclose information about their 
algorithms that contains trade secrets, violates the rights and freedoms of 
others (e.g. privacy), or allows data subjects to game or manipulate 
decision-making. 
Explanations of automated decisions need not hinge on the 
general public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even 
though interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, 
explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the black box. 
Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than 
merely understand, one can gauge the scope and content of explanations 
according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. 
From the perspective of individuals affected by automated 
decision-making, we propose three aims for explanations: (1) to inform 
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and help the individual understand why a particular decision was 
reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest the decision if the outcome is 
undesired, and (3) to understand what could be changed to receive a 
desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model. 
We assess how each of these goals finds support in the GDPR, and the 
extent to which they hinge on opening the ‘black box’. We suggest data 
controllers should offer a particular type of explanation, ‘unconditional 
counterfactual explanations’, to support these three aims. These 
counterfactual explanations describe the smallest change to the world 
that would obtain a desirable outcome, or to arrive at a “close possible 
world.” As multiple variables or sets of variables can lead to one or 
more desirable outcomes, multiple counterfactual explanations can be 
provided, corresponding to different choices of nearby possible worlds 
for which the counterfactual holds. Counterfactuals describe a 
dependency on the external facts that lead to that decision without the 
need to convey the internal state or logic of an algorithm. As a result, 
counterfactuals serve as a minimal solution that bypasses the current 
technical limitations of interpretability, while striking a balance between 
transparency and the rights and freedoms of others (e.g. privacy, trade 
secrets). 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been much discussion of the existence of a “right to 
explanation” in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
and its merits and disadvantages.
1
 Attempts to implement a right to 
explanation that opens the ‘black box’ to provide insight into the internal 
decision-making process of algorithms face four major legal and 
technical barriers. First, a legally binding right to explanation does not 
exist in the GDPR. Second, even if legally binding, the right would only 
apply in limited cases (when a negative decision was solely automated 
and had legal or other similar significant effects).2 Third, explaining the 
functionality of complex algorithmic decision-making systems and their 
rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem. 
Explanations may likewise offer little meaningful information to data 
subjects, raising questions about their value. Finally, data controllers 
have an interest in not sharing details of their algorithms to avoid 
disclosing trade secrets, violating the rights and freedoms of others (e.g. 
privacy), and allowing data subjects to game or manipulate the decision-
making system.3  
Despite these difficulties, the social and ethical value (and 
perhaps responsibility) of offering explanations to affected data subjects 
remains unaffected. One significant point has been neglected in this 
discussion. An explanation of automated decisions, both as envisioned 
by the GDPR and in general, does not necessarily hinge on the general 
public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even though 
such interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, 
explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the ‘black 
                                               
1
 Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of 
Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection 
Regulation,  INT. DATA PRIV. LAW (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903469; ISAK MENDOZA & LEE 
A. BYGRAVE, THE RIGHT NOT TO BE SUBJECT TO AUTOMATED DECISIONS BASED ON 
PROFILING (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2964855 (last visited May 18, 
2017); LILIAN EDWARDS & MICHAEL VEALE, SLAVE TO THE ALGORITHM? WHY A 
“RIGHT TO AN EXPLANATION” IS PROBABLY NOT THE REMEDY YOU ARE LOOKING FOR 
(2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2972855 (last visited Aug 12, 2017); 
Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated 
Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation,  INT. DATA PRIV. 
LAW (2017), https://academic.oup.com/idpl/advance-
article/doi/10.1093/idpl/ipx019/4626991 (last visited Dec 18, 2017). 
2
 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
3
 Jenna Burrell, How the Machine “Thinks:” Understanding Opacity in Machine 
Learning Algorithms,  BIG DATA SOC. (2016). 
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box’. Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act 
rather than merely understand, one could gauge the scope and content of 
explanations according to the specific goal or action they are intended to 
support. 
Explanations can serve many purposes. To investigate the 
potential scope of explanations it seems reasonable to start from the 
perspective of the data subject. We propose three aims for explanations 
to assist data subjects: (1) to inform and help the subject understand why 
a particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest 
adverse decisions, and (3) to understand what could be changed to 
receive a desired result in the future, based on the current decision-
making model.  As we show, the GDPR offers little support to achieve 
any of these aims. However, none hinge on explaining the internal logic 
of automated decision-making systems.  
Building trust is essential to increase societal acceptance of 
algorithmic decision-making. As a solution to close current gaps in 
transparency and accountability that undermine trust between data 
controllers and data subjects, we propose to move beyond the limitations 
of the GDPR. We argue that counterfactuals should be used as a means 
to provide explanations for individual decisions. 
 Unconditional counterfactual explanations should be given for 
positive and negative automated decisions, and regardless of whether the 
decisions are solely (as opposed to predominantly) automated, or 
produce legal or significant effects. This approach provides data subjects 
with meaningful explanations to understand a given decision, grounds to 
contest it and advice on how the data subject can change their behaviour 
or situation to possibly receive a desired decision (e.g. loan approval) in 
the future, without facing the severely limited applicability imposed by 
the GDPR’s definition of automated individual decision-making. 
 In this paper, we present the concept of unconditional 
counterfactual explanations as a novel type of explanation of automated 
decisions that overcomes many challenges facing current work on 
algorithmic interpretability and accountability. We situate 
counterfactuals in the philosophical history of knowledge, as well as 
historical and modern research on interpretability and fairness in 
machine learning. Based on the potential advantages offered to data 
subjects by counterfactual explanations, we then assess their alignment 
with the GDPR’s numerous provisions concerning automated decision-
making. Specifically, we examine whether the GDPR offers support for 
explanations that aim to help data subjects understand the scope of 
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automated decision-making and rationale of specific decisions; 
explanations to contest decisions; and explanations that offer guidance 
on how data subjects can change their behaviour to receive a desired 
result. We conclude that unconditional counterfactual explanations can 
bridge the gap between the interests of data subjects and data controllers, 
which otherwise act as a barrier to a legally binding right to explanation. 
I. COUNTERFACTUALS 
Counterfactual explanations take a similar form to the statement: 
 
“You were denied a loan because your annual income was £30,000. If 
your income had been £45,000 you would have been offered a loan.” 
 
Here the statement of decision is followed by a counterfactual, or 
statement of how the world would have to be different for a desirable 
outcome to occur. Multiple counterfactuals are possible, as multiple 
desirable outcomes can exist, and there may be several ways to achieve 
any of these outcomes. The concept of “closest possible world,” or the 
smallest change to the world that can be made to obtain a desirable 
outcome, is key throughout the discussion of counterfactuals. In many 
situations, providing several explanations covering a range of diverse 
counterfactuals, corresponding to relevant or informative “close possible 
worlds” rather than “the closest possible world” may be more helpful.  
Knowing the smallest possible change to a variable or set of variables to 
arrive at a different outcome may not always be the most helpful type of 
counterfactual. Rather, relevance will depend also upon other case-
specific factors, such as the mutability of a variable or real world 
probability of a change (see Section #). 
In the existing literature, “explanation” typically refers to an 
attempt to convey the internal state or logic of an algorithm that leads to 
a decision.4 In contrast, counterfactuals describe a dependency on the 
external facts that led to that decision. This is a crucial distinction. In 
modern machine learning, the internal state of the algorithm can consist 
of millions of variables intricately connected in a large web of 
dependent behaviours. Conveying this state to a layperson in a way that 
allows them to reason about the behaviour of an algorithm is extremely 
challenging. 
                                               
4
 Id. 
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The machine learning and legal communities have both taken 
relatively restricted views on what passes for an explanation. The 
machine learning community has been primarily concerned with 
debugging and conveying approximations of algorithms that 
programmers or researchers could use to understand which features are 
important; while law and ethics scholars have been more concerned with 
understanding the internal logic of decisions as a means to assess their 
lawfulness (e.g. prevent discriminatory outcomes), contest them, 
increase accountability generally, and clarify liability.  
As such, our proposal for counterfactuals as explanations lies 
outside of the taxonomies of explanations proposed previously in 
machine learning, legal and ethical literature. In contrast, analytic 
philosophy has taken a much broader view of knowledge and how 
counterfactuals can be used as justifications of beliefs (or in our case, 
decisions).  
A. HISTORIC CONTEXT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
Analytic Philosophy has a long history of analysing the necessary 
conditions for propositional knowledge. Expressions of the type ‘S 
knows that p’ constitute knowledge, “where S refers to the knowing 
subject, and p to the proposition that is known.” Traditional approaches, 
which conceive of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’, conceive of three 
necessary conditions: truth, belief, and justification. According to this 
approach, in order to know something, it is not enough to simply believe 
that something is true, but that you must also have a good reason for 
believing it. Our interest in this literature comes from the observation 
that such justifications of belief can serve as explanations, as 
fundamentally they are a reason that a belief is held, and therefore serve 
as an answer to the question “Why do you believe X?”. Therefore, 
understanding the different forms these justifications can take opens the 
door to a broader class of explanations than previously encountered in 
interpretability research. 
Although influential, ‘justified true belief’ has faced much 
criticism and inspired substantial analysis of modifications to the 
tripartite, and proposals of additional necessary conditions for a 
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proposition to constitute knowledge.5 Modal conditions, including 
safety6 and sensitivity,7 have been proposed as necessary additions to the 
tripartite built on counterfactual relations.8  
 
Following Sosa9, Ichikawa and Steup10 define sensitivity as: 
 
If p were false, S would not believe that p. 
Here, the statement “If p were false” is a counterfactual defining a 
“possible world” close to the world in which p is true.11 The sensitivity 
condition suggests that “in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, 
the subject does not believe that p.”12 Our notion of counterfactual 
explanations hinges upon the related concept: 
If q were false, S would not believe p. 
We claim that in this case q serves as an explanation of S’s belief in p, 
inasmuch as S only holds belief p while q is true, and that changing q 
would also cause S’s belief to change. A key point, worth emphasising, 
is that such statements only describe S’s beliefs, which need not reflect 
reality.
13
 As such, these statements can be made without knowledge of 
any causal relationship between q and p.  
We define Counterfactual Explanations as statements taking the 
form: 
Score p was returned because variables V had values (v1, v2,...) 
associated with them. If V instead had values (v1', v2',...) score p' 
would have been returned. 
                                               
5
 Jonathan Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge,  in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2017 ed. 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/knowledge-analysis/. 
6
 Ernest Sosa, How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, 13 PHILOS. PERSPECT. 141–153 
(1999). 
7
 Jonathan Ichikawa, Quantifiers, knowledge, and counterfactuals, 82 PHILOS. 
PHENOMENOL. RES. 287–313 (2011); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 
(1981). 
8
 For an excellent review of these concepts and their criticisms see section 5 of 
Ichikawa and Steup, supra note 5.. 
9
 Sosa, supra note 6. 
10
 Ichikawa and Steup, supra note 5. 
11
 DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973). 
12
 Ichikawa and Steup, supra note 5. 
13
 For example, S could believe that a person is inherently more trustworthy (p) 
because they are a Capricorn (q).  
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While many such explanations are possible, an ideal counterfactual 
explanation would alter values as little as possible and represent a 
closest world under which score p' is returned instead of p. The notion of 
a “closest possible world” is thus implicit in our definition. 
 Our version of counterfactuals perhaps most resembles a 
structural equations approach in execution by identifying alterations to 
variables more similar to Pearl’s “mini-surgeries”14 than Lewis’ 
“miracles.”15 In any case, our approach does not rely on knowledge of 
the causal structure of the world (see section ’Causality and Fairness’), 
or suggest which (context-dependent) metric of distance between worlds 
is preferable to establish causality.16 In many situations, it will be more 
informative to provide a diverse set of counterfactual explanations, 
corresponding to different choices of nearby possible worlds for which 
the counterfactual holds (or a preferred outcome is delivered), rather 
than a theoretically ideal counterfactual describing the “closest possible 
world” according to a preferred distance metric.17 Many considerations 
will be relevant to the choice of distance metric and a ‘sufficient’ and 
‘relevant’ set of counterfactual explanations, many of which will be 
dependent on the facts of a specific case (e.g. capabilities of the 
individual concerned, sensitivity and mutability of the variables 
involved in a decision, ethical or legal requirements for disclosure).
18
 
Similarly, counterfactuals that describe changes to multiple 
variables within the model can be provided. These would represent 
possible futures brought about by changes to the individual’s 
circumstances. As an example, the impact of changes in income could 
be calculated in combination with changes to career, thereby ensuring 
the counterfactual represents a realistic possible world. 
                                               
14
 JUDEA PEARL, CAUSATION (2000). 
15
 LEWIS, supra note 11. 
16
 Boris Kment, Counterfactuals and explanation, 115 MIND 261–310 (2006). 
17
 The merits of different metrics of distance between possible worlds have long been 
debated in philosophy without the emergence of consensus. Meaningfully addressing 
this debate goes beyond the scope of this paper which proposes a method for 
counterfactual explanations, but will be explored in future work. For further discussion 
of distance metrics and counterfactuals, see: LEWIS, supra note 11; Ernest W. Adams, 
On the rightness of certain counterfactuals, 74 PAC. PHILOS. Q. 1–10 (1993); Kment, 
supra note 16. 
18
 A discussion of appropriate metrics for making these choices goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, but will be addressed in future work. With that said, relevant 
philosophical discussion can be found on determining relevance of possible causal or 
contrastive explanations, counterfactuals, and distance metrics. See for example: Peter 
Lipton, Contrastive explanation, 27 R. INST. PHILOS. SUPPL. 247–266 (1990); Adams, 
supra note 17. 
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B. EXPLANATIONS IN A.I. AND MACHINE LEARNING 
Much of the early work in A.I. on explaining the decisions made by 
expert or rule-based systems focused on classes of explanation closely 
related to counterfactuals. For example, Gregor and Benbasat19 offer the 
following example of what they call a type 1 explanation: 
 
Q: Why is a tax cut appropriate? 
A: Because a tax cuts preconditions are high inflation and 
trade deficits, and current conditions include these factors. 
 
While Buchanan and Shortliffe20 offer a similar example: 
 
RULE009 IF:  
1) The gram stain of the organism is gramneg, and 
2) The morphology of the organism is coccus 
THEN: There is strongly suggestive evidence (.8) that the 
Identity of the organism is Neisseria 
  
As is typical in early A.I. questions we now recognise as hard such as 
“How do we decide inflation is high?”, or “Why are these the 
preconditions of a tax cut?” are assumed to have been addressed by 
humans. As such, the explanations do not provide insight into what 
people in machine learning think of as the internal logic of black box 
classifiers. In fact, the first example can be rewritten as two diverse 
counterfactual statements: 
 
“If inflation was lower, a tax cut would not be recommended.” 
 
“If there was no trade deficit, a tax cut would not be recommended.” 
 
While the second example is closely related to the counterfactual:21 
 
“If the gram stain was negative or the morphology was not coccus, the 
algorithm would not be confident that the organism is Neisseria.” 
                                               
19
 Shirley Gregor & Izak Benbasat, Explanations from intelligent systems: Theoretical 
foundations and implications for practice,  MIS Q. 497–530 (1999). 
20
 B. G. BUCHANAN & E. D. SHORTLIFFE, RULE-BASED EXPERT SYSTEMS: THE MYCIN 
EXPERIMENTS OF THE STANFORD HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING PROJECT (1984). 
21
 However, they are not logically equivalent. The example from MYCIN differs in 
that it is still possible that some samples that are either gram positive or have a 
different morphology could still be classified as Neisseria. 
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The most important difference between these approaches and 
counterfactuals is that counterfactuals continue functioning in an end-to-
end integrated approach. If the gram stain and morphology in the 
MYCIN example were also determined by the algorithm, 
counterfactuals would automatically return a close sample with a 
different classification, while these early methods could not be applied 
to such involved scenarios. 
As focus has switched from A.I. and logic based systems, and 
towards machine learning tasks such as image recognition, the notion of 
an explanation has come to refer to providing insight into the internal 
state of an algorithm, or to human understandable approximations of the 
algorithm. As such, the most related machine learning work to these, 
and to ours, is Martens and Provost.22 Uniquely, of other works in 
machine learning, it shares our interest in making interventions to alter 
the outcome of classifier responses. However, the work is firmly linked 
to the problem of document classification, and the only interventions it 
proposes involve the removal of words from documents, to stop 
websites being classified as “adult.” The heuristic proposed cannot be 
easily generalised to either continuous variables,23 or even the addition 
of words to documents. 
The majority of works in machine learning on explanations and 
interpreting models concern themselves with generating simple models 
as local approximations of decisions.24 Generally, the idea is to create a 
simple human-understandable approximation of a decision-making 
algorithm that accurately models the decision given the current inputs, 
but may be arbitrarily bad for different inputs. However, there are 
numerous difficulties with treating these approaches as explanations 
suitable for a lay data subject. 
In general, it is unclear if these models are interpretable by non-
experts. Moreover, the utility of such approaches, outside of model 
debugging by expert programmers, is unclear. As we show in the 
                                               
22
 David Martens & Foster Provost, Explaining data-driven document classifications,  
(2013). 
23
 ‘Continuous variables’ refers to measurements such as height or weight. 
24
 Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, Why should i trust you?: 
Explaining the predictions of any classifier,  in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM 
SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA 
MINING 1135–1144 (2016); Ramprasaath R. Selvaraju et al., Grad-CAM: Why did you 
say that?,  ARXIV PREPR. ARXIV161107450 (2016); Karen Simonyan, Andrea Vedaldi 
& Andrew Zisserman, Deep inside convolutional networks: Visualising image 
classification models and saliency maps,  ARXIV PREPR. ARXIV13126034 (2013). 
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supplementary materials, even in simple scenarios, these local models 
can produce widely varying estimates of the importance of variables, 
which, even in the single variable case, make it extremely difficult to 
reason about how a function varies as the inputs change. 
These approaches make a three-way trade-off between the 
quality of the approximation vs. the ease of understanding the function 
and the size of the domain for which the approximation is valid.25 We 
are unaware of any work on conveying the various limitations and 
unreliabilities of these approaches to a lay audience in such a way that 
they can make use of such explanations. 
In contrast, counterfactual explanations are intentionally 
restricted. They are crafted in such a way as to provide a minimal 
amount of information capable of altering a decision; and they do not 
require the data subject to understand any of the internal logic of a 
model in order to make use of it. The downside to this is that individual 
counterfactuals may be overly restrictive, and a single counterfactual 
may show how a decision is based on data that is both correct, and 
cannot be altered by the data subject before future decisions, even if 
other data exists that could be amended for a favourable outcome. This 
could be resolved by offering multiple diverse counterfactual 
explanations to the data subject.  
C. ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS AND COUNTERFACTUAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
The techniques used to generate counterfactual explanations on deep 
networks such as resnet are already widely studied in the machine 
learning literature under the name of ‘Adversarial Perturbations’. 
Algorithms capable of computing counterfactuals are used to confuse 
existing classifiers by generating a synthetic data point close to an 
existing one such that the new synthetic data point is classified 
differently to the original one. 
One strength of counterfactuals is that they can be efficiently and 
effectively computed by applying standard techniques, even to cutting-
edge architectures. Some of the largest and deepest neural networks are 
used in the field of computer vision, particularly in image labelling tasks 
such as ImageNet. These classifiers have been shown to be particularly 
                                               
25
 Osbert Bastani, Carolyn Kim & Hamsa Bastani, Interpretability via Model 
Extraction,  in FAT-ML 2017 (2017); Himabindu Lakkaraju et al., Interpretable & 
Explorable Approximations of Black Box Models,  (2017). 
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vulnerable to a type of attack referred to as “Adversarial Perturbation”26 
where small changes to a given image can result in the image being 
assigned to an entirely different class. For example, DeepFool27 defines 
an adverse perturbation of an image x, given a classifier, as the smallest 
change to x such that the classification changes. Essentially, this is a 
counterfactual by a different name. Finding a closest possible world to x 
such that the classifier changes is, under the right choice of distance 
function, the same as finding the smallest change to x. 
Importantly, none of the standard works on Adversarial 
Perturbations make use of appropriate distance functions, and the 
majority of such approaches tend to favour making small changes to 
many variables, instead of providing sparse human interpretable 
solutions that modify only a few variables.
28
 Despite this, efficient 
computation of counterfactuals and Adversarial Perturbations is made 
possible by virtue of state-of-the-art algorithms being differentiable; and 
many optimisation techniques proposed in the Adversarial Perturbation 
literature are directly applicable to this problem, making counterfactual 
generation efficient.  
One of the more challenging aspects of Adversarial Perturbations 
is that these small perturbations of an image are barely human 
perceptible, but result in drastically different classifier responses. 
Informally, this appears to happen because the newly generated images 
do not lie in the “space of real-images,” but slightly outside it. This 
phenomenon serves as an important reminder that when computing 
counterfactuals by searching for a close possible world, it is at least as 
important that the solution found comes from a “possible world,” as it is 
that it is close to the starting example. Further research into how data 
from high-dimensional and highly-structured spaces, such as natural 
images, can be characterised is needed before counterfactuals can be 
reliably used as explanations in these spaces. 
                                               
26
 Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens & Christian Szegedy, Explaining and harnessing 
adversarial examples,  ARXIV PREPR. ARXIV14126572 (2014); Seyed-Mohsen 
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi & Pascal Frossard, Deepfool: a simple and 
accurate method to fool deep neural networks,  in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 2574–2582 (2016); 
Christian Szegedy et al., Intriguing properties of neural networks,  ARXIV PREPR. 
ARXIV13126199 (2013). 
27
 Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard, supra note 23. 
28
 Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas & Sakurai Kouichi, One pixel attack for 
fooling deep neural networks,  ARXIV171008864 CS STAT (2017), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08864 (last visited Dec 18, 2017). 
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D. CAUSALITY AND FAIRNESS 
Several works have approached the problem of guaranteeing that 
algorithms are fair i.e. that they do not exhibit a bias towards particular 
ethnic, gender, or other protected groups, using causal reasoning29 and  
counterfactuals.30 Kusner et al.31 consider counterfactuals where the 
subject belongs to a different race or sex and require that the decision 
made to remain the same under this counterfactual for it to be considered 
fair. In contrast, we consider counterfactuals in which the decision 
differs from its current state. 
Many works have suggested that transparency might be a useful 
tool for enforcing fairness. While it is unclear how counterfactuals could 
be used for this purpose, it is also unclear if any form of explanation of 
individual decisions can in fact help. Grgic-Hlaca et al.32 showed how 
our intuitions can be easily misled, by understandable models, and that 
predominantly using features people believed to be fair, slightly 
increased the racism exhibited by algorithms, while decreasing 
accuracy. In general, the best tools for uncovering systematic biases are 
likely to be based upon large-scale statistical analysis and not upon 
explanations of individual decisions. 
With that said, counterfactuals can provide evidence that an 
algorithmic decision is affected by a protected variable (e.g. race), which 
may be discriminatory.
33
 For the types of distance function we consider 
in the next section, if the counterfactuals found change someone’s race, 
then the treatment of that individual is dependent on race. The converse 
statement is, however, not true. Counterfactuals which do not modify a 
protected attribute cannot be used as evidence that the attribute was 
irrelevant to the decision. This is because counterfactuals describe only a 
dependency between a decision and specific external facts, not all 
external facts.  
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 Niki Kilbertus et al., Avoiding Discrimination through Causal Reasoning,  ARXIV 
PREPR. ARXIV170602744 (2017). 
30
 Matt J. Kusner et al., Counterfactual Fairness,  (2017). 
31
 Id. 
32
 Nina Grgic-Hlaca et al., The case for process fairness in learning: Feature selection 
for fair decision making,  in NIPS SYMPOSIUM ON MACHINE LEARNING AND THE LAW 
(2016). 
33
 Establishing the influence of a protected variable on a decision does not, by itself, 
prove that illegal discrimination has occurred. Mitigating factors may exist which 
justify the usage of a protected attribute. See for example discussion of disparate 
treatment in American anti-discrimination law; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, 
Big data’s disparate impact, 104 CALIF. LAW REV. (2016). 
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II. GENERATING COUNTERFACTUALS 
In the following section, we give examples of how meaningful 
counterfactuals can be easily computed. Many of the standard classifiers 
of machine learning (including Neural Networks, Support Vector 
Machines and Regressors) are trained by finding the optimal set of 
weights w that minimises an objective over a set of training data. 
 
 
 
Where yi is the label for data point xi and ρ(·) is a regularizer over the 
weights. Replacing the label y by the target y' decision we can find a 
new counterfactual x' that is as close to the original as possible by 
holding w fixed and minimizing the related objective. 
 
 
 
Where d(·,·) is a distance function that measures how far the 
counterfactual x' and the original data point xi are from one another. In 
practice, maximisation over λ is done by iteratively solving for x' and 
increasing λ until a sufficiently close solution is found. 
The choice of optimiser for these problems is relatively 
unimportant. In practice, any optimiser capable of training the classifier 
under Eq. (1) seems to work equally well, and we use ADAM34 for all 
experiments. As local minima are a concern, we initialise each run with 
different random values for x' and select as our counterfactual the best 
minimizer of Eq. (2). These different minima can be used as a diverse 
set of multiple counterfactuals. 
Of particular importance is the choice of distance function used 
to decide which synthetic data point x’ is closest to the original data 
point xi. As a sensible first choice, which should be refined based on 
subject- and task-specific requirements,  we suggest use of the L1 norm, 
or Manhattan distance, weighted by the inverse median absolute 
deviation. This is written as MADk for the median absolute deviation of 
feature k, over the set of points P: 
 
                                               
34
 Diederik Kingma & Jimmy Ba, Adam: A method for stochastic optimization, ARXIV 
PREPR. ARXIV14126980 (2014). 
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We chose d(·,·) as: 
 
 
 
This distance metric has several desirable properties. Firstly, it captures 
some of the intrinsic volatility of the space, which means that if a feature 
k varies wildly across the dataset, a synthetic point x’ may also vary this 
feature while remaining close to xi, under the distance measure. The use 
of median absolute difference rather than the more usual standard 
deviation makes the measure used more robust to outliers. Of equal 
importance is the sparsity inducing properties of the L1 norm. The L1 
norm is widely recognised in mathematical and machine learning circles 
for its tendency to induce sparse solutions in which most entries are zero 
when paired with an appropriate cost function.
35
  
When computing human-understandable counterfactuals this 
property is highly desirable as it corresponds to counterfactuals in which 
only a small number of variables are changed and most remain constant, 
making the counterfactuals much easier to communicate and 
comprehend. Out of the box this measure works equally well on the 
examples we consider.  
To demonstrate the importance of the choice of distance 
function, below we illustrate the impact of varying d(·,·) on the LSAT 
dataset. A further challenge lies in ensuring that the synthetic 
counterfactual x’ corresponds to a valid data point. We illustrate some of 
the pitfalls and remedies for dealing with discrete features when 
computing counterfactuals. 
A. LSTAT DATASET 
We first consider the generations of counterfactuals on the LSTAT
36
 
dataset. In particular, we consider a stripped-down version used in the 
                                               
35
 Emmanuel J. Candes, Justin K. Romberg & Terence Tao, Stable signal recovery 
from incomplete and inaccurate measurements, 59 COMMUN. PURE APPL. MATH. 
1207–1223 (2006). 
36
 R. Darrell Bock & Marcus Lieberman, Fitting a response model forn dichotomously 
scored items, 35 PSYCHOMETRIKA 179–197 (1970). 
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fairness literature
37
 that attempts to predict students’ first-year average 
grade on the basis of their race, grade-point average prior to law school, 
and law school entrance exam scores. This stripped down version of 
LSTAT dataset is used in the fairness literature, as classifiers trained on 
this data naturally exhibit bias against black people. As a result, we will 
find evidence of this bias in our neural network in some of the 
counterfactuals we generate. 
We generate a three-layer fully-connected neural-network, with 
two hidden layers of 20 neurons each feeding into a final classifier. Even 
a small model like this has 941 different weights controlling its 
behaviour and 40 neurons that exhibit complex interdependencies, 
which makes conveying its internal state challenging.   
Choosing d as the unweighted squared Euclidean distance 
 
we consider the Counterfactual “What would have to be changed to give 
a predicted score of 0?”38 Directly solving for Eq. 2, gives the results in 
the central block labelled “Cf. Continuous” in Table 1.  
  
 
Table 1 - Unnormalied L2 
Two artefacts are immediately apparent. The first is that although race 
should be a discrete value taking labels only 0 or 1, corresponding to 
white or black respectively,  a variety of meaningless values, either 
fractional or negative have been assigned to it. In the literature on 
adversarial perturbation, generally values are capped to lie within a 
sensible range such as [0,1] to stop some of these artefacts from 
occurring. However, this would still allow the fractional solutions shown 
in the bottom two examples. Instead, we clamp the race variable forcing 
it to take either value 0 or 1 in two separate run-throughs, and then take 
as a solution the closest counterfactual found in either of the runs. These 
                                               
37
 Chris Russell et al., When worlds collide: integrating different counterfactual 
assumptions in fairness,  in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
SYSTEMS 6396–6405 (2017). 
38
 The scores being predicted are normalised, with 0 corresponding to the average 
score. 
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results can be seen in the rightmost column “counterfactual hybrid.” The 
algorithm now suggests always changing the race to white as part of the 
counterfactual. Of particular note is  that the counterfactuals show that 
black students would get better scores.  
The second artefact is that the algorithm much prefers 
significantly varying the GPA than the exam results, and this is down to 
our choice of distance function. We took as d, the squared Euclidean 
distance, and this generally prefers changes that are as small as possible 
and spread uniformly across all variables. However, the range of the 
GPA is much smaller than that of the exam scores. Adjusting for this by 
normalising each component by its standard deviation, i.e.  
 
gives the set of counterfactuals shown in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2 - Normalised L2 
After normalisation, the GPA remains much more consistent, and 
naturally remains within an expected range of values. Note that for black 
students race does vary under the computed counterfactual, revealing a 
dependence between the decision and race (which is often a legally 
protected attribute).  
Finally, we show the use of the L1 norm weighted by the inverse 
median absolute deviation (Table 3). This returns similar but sparser 
results to the weighted squared Euclidean distance, with the GPA not 
being changed under the counterfactuals. 
 
Table 3 - Normalised L1 
B. PIMA DIABETES DATABASE 
To demonstrate Counterfactuals on a more complex problem we 
consider a database used to predict whether women of Pima heritage are 
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at risk of diabetes
39
. We generate a classifier that returns a risk score 
between [0, 1] by training a similar three-layer fully-connected neural-
network, with two hidden layers of 20 neurons, to perform logistic 
regression. This classifier takes as input 10 different variables of varying 
predictive power, including number of pregnancies, age and BMI. 
Counterfactuals are generated to answer the question “What would have 
to be different for this individual to have a risk score of 0.5?” To induce 
sparsity in the answer, and generate counterfactuals that are easy for a 
human to evaluate, with only a small number of changed variables, we 
make use of the L1 norm or Manhattan distance, weighted by the inverse 
median absolute deviation, instead of the Euclidean distance. We also 
cap variables to prevent them from going outside the range seen in the 
training data. 
With this done, the counterfactuals tend to be sparse and can be 
rendered in human readable text form. 
 
Person 1: If your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 154.3, you 
would have a score of 0.51 
Person 2: If your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 169.5, you 
would have a score of 0.51 
Person 3: If your Plasma glucose concentration was 158.3 and 
your 2-Hour serum insulin level was 160.5, you would have a 
score of 0.51 
 
These counterfactuals are similar to the risk factors already used by 
doctors to communicate e.g. "If your body mass index is greater than 40 
you are morbidly obese, and at greater risk of ill-health." However, 
counterfactuals may make use of multiple factors and convey a 
personalised risk model that takes into account other attributes that may 
mitigate or increase risk. 
C. CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS AND COUNTERFACTUAL 
EXPLANATIONS 
The reader familiar with causal modelling may have noticed that our 
counterfactual explanations are not making use of causal models, or 
equivalently that they make naive assumptions that variables are 
                                               
39
 Jack W. Smith et al., Using the ADAP learning algorithm to forecast the onset of 
diabetes mellitus,  in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTER 
APPLICATION IN MEDICAL CARE 261 (1988). 
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independent of one another. There are several reasons for this. One 
important use of counterfactual explanations is to provide the data 
subject with information to make a guided audit of the data, and check 
for relevant inaccuracies in the data. Treating such errors as independent 
and drawn from a robust distribution such as the Laplacian 
(corresponding to use of the L1 norm in our objective), is a sensible 
model for these errors. More importantly, creating and interpreting 
accurate causal models is difficult. Requiring data controllers to build 
and convey to a lay audience a causal model that accurately captures the 
interdependencies between measurements such as the number of 
pregnancies, age and BMI is extremely challenging, and may be 
irrelevant.  
Counterfactuals generated from an accurate causal model may 
ultimately be of use to experts e.g. to medical professionals trying to 
decide which intervention will move a patient out of an at risk group. 
However, the purpose of our paper is to illustrate how far you can go 
with minimal assumptions, and that such detailed causal models are 
unnecessary for counterfactual explanations to be of use. 
III. ADVANTAGES OF COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS 
Counterfactual explanations differ markedly from existing proposals in 
the machine learning and legal communities (particularly regarding the 
GDPR’s ‘right to explanation’),40 while offering several advantages. 
Principally, counterfactuals bypass the substantial challenge of 
explaining the internal workings of complex machine learning 
systems.41 Even if technically feasible, such explanations may be of little 
practical value to data subjects. In contrast, counterfactuals provide 
information to the data subject that is both easily digestible and 
practically useful for understanding the reasons for a decision, 
challenging them, and altering future behaviour for a better result.  
                                               
40
 Although a right to explanation is not itself legally binding, data subjects are entitled 
to receive “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance 
and the envisaged consequences” of automated decision-making under the GDPR's Art 
13-15. Others have proposed that these provisions require the data subject to be given 
information about the internal logic and the rationale of specific decisions. The 
information sought aligns with the type of explanation pursued in the machine learning 
community. For an explanation of why such information is not legally required, and 
why Art. 13-15 do not constitute a de facto right to explanation, see Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
41
 Burrell, supra note 3. 
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The reduced regulatory burden of counterfactual explanations is 
also significant. Current state-of-the-art machine learning methods42 
make decisions based upon deep networks that compose together 
functions more than a thousand times, and with more than ten million 
parameters controlling their behaviour. As the working memory of 
humans can contain around seven distinct items,43 it remains unclear 
whether human-comprehensible meaningful information’ about the logic 
involved in a particular decision can ever exist, disregarding whether 
such information could be meaningfully conveyed to non-experts.44 As 
such regulations that require meaningful information regarding the 
internal logic to be conveyable to a lay audience, could prohibit the use 
of many standard approaches. In contrast, counterfactual explanations do 
not attempt to convey the logic involved and, as shown in the previous 
section, are simple to compute and convey.  
Such expectations of providing information regarding the 
internal logic of algorithmic decision-making systems have surfaced 
recently in relation to the GDPR, and in particular the ‘right to 
explanation’. The GDPR contains numerous provisions requiring 
information to be communicated to individuals about automated 
decision-making. Significant discussion has emerged in legal and 
machine learning communities regarding the specific requirements and 
limitations of the GDPR in this regard, and in particular how to provide 
information about decisions made by highly complex automated 
systems. As counterfactuals provide a method to explain some of the 
rationale of an automated decision while avoiding the major pitfalls of 
interpretability or opening the ‘black box’, they may prove a highly 
useful mechanism to meet the explicit requirements and background 
aims of the GDPR. 
IV. COUNTERFACTUAL EXPLANATIONS AND THE GDPR 
Although the GDPR’s ‘right to explanation’ is not legally binding,45 it 
has nonetheless connected discussion of data protection law to the 
longstanding question of how algorithmic decisions can be explained to 
                                               
42
 For example, Kaiming He et al., Deep residual learning for image recognition,  in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN 
RECOGNITION 770–778 (2016); Gao Huang et al., Deep networks with stochastic depth,  
in EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION 646–661 (2016). 
43
 George A. Miller, The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our 
capacity for processing information., 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (1956). 
44
 Burrell, supra note 3. 
45
 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
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experts as well as non-expert parties affected by the decision. Answering 
this question largely depends upon the intended purpose of the 
explanation; the information to be provided must be tailored in terms of 
structure, complexity and content with a particular aim in mind. 
Unfortunately, the GDPR does not define requirements for explanations 
of automated decision-making, and provides few hints as to the intended 
purpose of explanations of automated decision-making. Recital 71 of the 
GDPR, a non-binding provision, states that suitable safeguards against 
automated decision-making should be implemented and “should include 
specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human 
intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation 
of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the 
decision.”  
This is the only time where an explanation is mentioned in the 
GDPR, leaving the reader with little insight into what type of 
explanation is intended, or what purpose it should serve. Based on the 
text, the only clear indication is that legislators wanted to clarify that 
some type of explanation can voluntarily be offered after a decision has 
been made. This can be seen as Recital 71 separates “specific 
information” which should be given before a decision is made,46 from 
safeguards that apply after a decision has been made47 (“an explanation 
of the decision reached after such assessment [italics added]”).48 Further 
indications are not provided of the intended content of such ex post 
explanations. 
 The content of an explanation must reflect its intended purpose. 
Given the lack of guidance in the GDPR, many aims for explanations 
are feasible. Reflecting the GDPR’s emphasis on protections and rights 
                                               
46
 Jörg Hladjk, DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall,  in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG , Rn. 15 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds., 
1 ed. 2017). 
47
 The European Parliament makes the same distinction (information obligations vs. 
explanations of automated decisions) in their draft report on civil law rules on robotics 
when referring to the GDPR. See: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
LAW RULES ON ROBOTICS (2016), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-
582.443%2B01%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN (last visited Nov 11, 2016); Sandra 
Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Transparent, explainable, and 
accountable AI for robotics, 2 SCI. ROBOT. (2017). 
48
 Hladjk, supra note 42 at Rn. 15-16 also supports this view that an explanation should 
be given after a decision has been taken, while recognising that this is not legally 
binding.  
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for individuals, here we examine potential purposes for explanations 
from the perspective of the data subject. We propose three possible aims 
of explanations of automated decisions: to enhance understanding of the 
scope of automated decision-making and the reasons for a particular 
decision, to help contest a decision, and to alter future behaviour to 
potentially receive a preferred outcome. This is not an exhaustive list of 
potential aims of explanations, but rather reflects how the recipient of an 
automated decision, as with any type of decision, may wish to 
understand its scope, effects, and rationale, and take actions in response. 
In the following sections, we assess how these three purposes are 
reflected in the GDPR, and the extent to which counterfactual 
explanations meet and exceed the GDPR’s requirements.  
A. EXPLANATIONS TO UNDERSTAND DECISIONS 
One potential purpose of explanations is to provide the data subject with 
understanding of the scope of automated decision-making, and the 
reasons that led to a particular decision. Several provisions in the GDPR 
can support a data subject’s understanding of automated decision-
making, although the types of information that must be shared tend to 
enhance broad understanding of automated decision-making systems, as 
opposed to the rationale of specific decisions.49 As a result, the GDPR 
does not appear to require opening the ‘black box’ to explain the internal 
logic of the decision-making system to data subjects. With this in mind, 
counterfactuals can provide information aligned with the GDPR’s 
various informational requirements, while also providing some insight 
into the reasons that led to a particular decision. Counterfactuals, thus, 
could meet and exceed the requirements of the GDPR. 
The description of explanations in Recital 71 does not include a 
requirement to open the ‘black box’.50 Understanding the internal logic 
                                               
49
 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
50
 Id.; See also Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines on automated individual 
decision-making ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON 
AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND PROFILING FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
REGULATION 2016/679 (2017), 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2017/10/20171013_wp251_enpdf.pdf (last 
visited Oct 22, 2017)., which is very ambiguous but seems to support the claim that 
such a requirement is not only absent, but might not have been intended. On the one 
hand transparency in how decisions are made (Recital 71) appears to be very important 
(p. 16). However, at the same time, the guidelines state that the aim of Art 15(1)(h) is 
not to create individual explanations that require understanding the internal logic of the 
algorithm (p. 25). Hence, the guidelines suggest that Art 15(1)(h) calls for information 
about general system functionality, as is the case with its counterparts in Art 13(2)(f) 
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of the algorithmic decision-making system is not explicitly required. 
Elsewhere, the GDPR contains transparency mechanisms (Art 12), 
notification duties (Art 13-14), and the right of access (Art 15), all of 
which create informational requirements concerning automated 
decision-making. Art 13-15 describe what kind of information needs to 
be provided if data are collected, either immediately when collected 
from the data subject (Art 13), the latest after a month when collected 
from a third party (Art 14),51 or at any time if requested from the data 
subject (Art 15) (see below). Among other things, Art 12 explains how 
this information (as defined in Art 13-14) should be conveyed.52  Art 12-
14 suggest that data subjects must be provided with “a meaningful 
overview of the intended processing” (Art12(7)), including “the 
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to 
in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject,” (Art 
13(2)(f), Art 14(2)(g)) as opposed to a detailed explanation of the 
internal logic of a system after a decision has been made. 53 Rather they 
aim to offer a generic overview of intended processing activities, which 
enhances the data subject’s understanding of the scope and purpose of 
automated decision-making.54  
                                                                                                                  
and Art 14(2)(g). This reading of Articles 13-15 would suggest that the Article 29 
Working Party does not view non-binding Recital 71 as a requirement to explain the 
internal logic of individual decisions, as even the legally binding text in Article 
15(1)(h), which is sufficiently vague to allow such an interpretation (see: Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1, is not thought to create such a requirement. For 
further support that Recital 71 does not hinge on opening the black box, see: Martini, 
DS-GVO ART. 22 AUTOMATISIERTE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM EINZELFALL EINSCHLIEßLICH 
PROFILING DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG Rn 35-37 (Paal & Pauly eds., 1 ed. 
2017). 
51
 So called “just in time notification” ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING 
PARTY, supra note 46 at 28. 
52
 Dirk Heckmann & Anne Paschke, DS-GVO Art. 12 Transparente Information, 
Kommunikation, in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG , Rn. 1-2 (Eugen Ehmann & 
Martin Selmayr eds., 1 ed. 2017). 
53
 Lorenz Franck, DS-GVO Art. 12 Transparente Information, Kommunikation,  in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 , Rn. 9-10 (Peter Gola ed., 1 
ed. 2017); Sebastian Schulz, DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im 
Einzelfall,  in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 , Rn. 32-33 
(Peter Gola ed., 1 ed. 2017); Suzanne Rodway, Just how fair will processing notices 
need to be under the GDPR, 16 PRIV. DATA PROT. 16–17 (2016). 
54
 Christopher Kuner et al., Machine learning with personal data: is data protection 
law smart enough to meet the challenge?, 7 INT. DATA PRIV. LAW 1–2 (2017); 
ROSEMARY JAY, GUIDE TO THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: A 
COMPANION TO DATA PROTECTION LAW AND PRACTICE 227 (4th Revised edition 
edition ed. 2017). 
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Art 12(7) clarifies that the aim of Art 13-14 is to provide “in an 
easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner, a meaningful 
overview of the intended processing [italics added].” Two requirements 
are notable: (1) that the information provided must be meaningful to its 
recipient and broad in scope (a ‘meaningful overview’), and (2) that the 
notification occurs prior to processing (‘intended processing’). 
To understand what would constitute a ‘meaningful overview’, 
the envisioned medium of disclosure is instructive. Broadly applicable 
information appears to be required, rather than personalised disclosures. 
Legal scholars have suggested that notification duties can be satisfied 
via updates to existing privacy statements or notices55 (e.g. those 
displayed on websites or using QR codes).56 This requirement does not 
change based on the form of data collection.57 When data are collected 
from a third party (Art 14), an email sent to the data subject linking to 
the data controller’s privacy statement(s) could suffice.58 The same 
holds true for personalised links59 referring to the privacy notice. Tools 
similar to those currently used to make users aware of the usage of 
cookies or monitoring shopping behaviour can be envisioned to satisfy 
the requirements in Art 14, thus making data subjects immediately 
aware of data collection.60 Detailed information appears to not be 
necessary as Art 12(7) states that the required information can be 
provided along with standardised icons.61 In trilogue, the European 
Parliament proposed several standardised icons that were ultimately not 
adopted (see Appendix 2). Despite this, the proposed icons reveal the 
initial expectations of regulators for simple, easily understood 
information.62  
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 ALAIN BENSOUSSAN, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: TEXTS, 
COMMENTARIES AND PRACTICAL GUIDELINES 113 (01 edition ed. 2017); Franck, supra 
note 49 at Rn. 12-13; JAY, supra note 50 at 223; Heckmann and Paschke, supra note 
48 at Rn. 13-15; Rainer Knyrim, DS-GVO Art. 14 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung 
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Martin Selmayr eds., 1 ed. 2017); ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, 
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 Lorenz Franck, DS-GVO Art. 13 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Daten,  in 
DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG VO (EU) 2016/679 , Rn. 34-35 (Peter Gola ed., 1 
ed. 2017). 
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 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 50 at 14. 
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 Knyrim, supra note 57 at Rn. 1-14. 
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 Franck, supra note 54 at Rn. 23-24. 
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 Knyrim, supra note 56 at Rn. 25-26. 
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 Id. at Rn. 9-10.; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 51 at 
28. 
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These examples suggest Art 13-14 aim to provide a general 
overview of data processing that will be meaningful to all data subjects 
involved (e.g. all users of Twitter). The captive audience is more likely 
to be the general public or user base, not individual users, and their 
unique circumstances.63 This format of disclosure suggests notifications 
should be comprehensible to a general audience with mixed expertise 
and background knowledge. An “uneducated layperson” may be the 
envisioned audience for disclosures.64 This coincides with the general 
notion of Art 12(1) that all information and communication with the data 
subject has to be in a “concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form,” suggesting in-depth technical information and 
‘legalese’ would be inappropriate.65 At a minimum, each provision 
suggests that information disclosures need to be tailored to their 
audience, with envisioned audiences including children (Recital 71) and 
uneducated laypeople. 
Notifications regarding automated decision-making (Art 
13(2)(f), Art 14(2)(g)) face particular constraints within an overall 
“meaningful overview.” According to the, Article 29 Working Party,66 
the UK Information Commissioner’s Office67 and other commentators, 68 
informing the data subject about the “significance and envisaged 
consequences of automated decision-making” in a very simple manner, 
including “how profiling might affect the data subject generally, rather 
than information about a specific decision” will be sufficient.69 For 
instance, an explanation of how a low rating of creditworthiness can 
affect payment options,
70
 how intended data processing may result in a 
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 See Recital 58; Heckmann and Paschke, supra note 52 at Rn. 22. note that this 
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credit or job application being declined,
71
 or how driving behaviour 
might impact insurance premiums would be sufficient.72 Similarly, 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” is said to require 
only “clarification of the categories of data used to create a profile, the 
source of the data; and why this data is considered relevant”73 as 
opposed to a “detailed technical description about how an algorithm or 
machine learning works.”74  
This view is echoed in the Article 29 Working Party’s guidelines 
on automated individual decision-making, as they state that “details of 
the main characteristics considered in reaching the decision, the source 
of this information and the relevance” should be provided under Art 13-
14.
75
 Further, the “controller should find simple ways to tell the data 
subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching 
the decision without necessarily always attempting a complex 
explanation of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm.”76 
It is however important to note that this requirement, despite referring to 
the decision-making ‘rationale’, seems to refer to general system 
functionality rather than an explanation of an individual decision.77 The 
guidelines state that Art 15(1)(h), which is seen to provide identical 
information as Articles 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g),78 “implies a more general 
form of oversight, rather than a right to an explanation of a particular 
decision.”79 It is argued that the aim of these Articles is to demonstrate 
how automated process help data controllers to make more accurate, 
unbiased and responsible decisions and illustrate how the data, 
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 Rodway, supra note 54. 
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 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 51 at 14–15. 
73
 INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, supra note 68 at 15. 
74
 Id. at 15–16. See also: Eugen Ehmann, DS-GVO Art. 15 Auskunftsrecht der 
betroffenen Person,  in DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG , Rn. 16-17 (Eugen 
Ehmann & Martin Selmayr eds., 1 ed. 2017), who argues that Art 15 only entitles the 
data subject to know about the abstract logic and principles of data processing, but not 
the formula or code. Reference is made to Recital 63 in the English and French 
versions of the GDPR to support this claim. See also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION 
WORKING PARTY, supra note 51 at 14., which states “The controller should find simple 
ways to tell the data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in 
reaching the decision without necessarily always attempting a complex explanation of 
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characteristics, and method used are suitable to achieve this goal.80 In 
other words, the process of decision-making and the algorithms itself do 
not need to be fully disclosed, but rather a description of the logic of the 
algorithm, which may include a list of data sources or variables.81 
Each disclosure under Art 13-14 must occur prior to data 
processing (Art 12(7)) or at the time of data collection, but before 
automated decision-making starts.82 Evidence of this is seen in the 
future-oriented language used in Art 13(2)(f) and Art 14(2)(g)),83 the 
obligation for information about the necessity of providing data for 
processing (Art 13(2)(e)), the clarification in Art 12(7) that information 
must be provided about “intended processing,” and other provisions  and 
jurisprudence.84 For automated decision-making, it is essential that 
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81
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0402&language=EN (last visited Nov 10, 2016). 
82
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 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
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DATENSCHUTZ-GRUNDVERORDNUNG , Rn. 59-64 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr 
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information is provided before the start, else the right not to be subject 
of an automated decision can never be realised. The data subject has no 
chance to assess the associated risks,85 or whether one of the grounds in 
Art 22(2) (contract, law, explicit consent) actually apply that allow 
automated decision-making. If notifications do not occur prior to 
processing or decision-making, data subjects would only be able to 
contest decisions after the fact. This can be time and cost intensive, and 
unable to repair financial or reputational damage. Hence, one purpose of 
Art 13-14 is to make the data subject aware of future86 processing and to 
allow them to decide if they want their data to be processed (e.g. 
consent),87 assess the legitimacy (based on Member State law or 
contract) or exercise other rights in the GDPR.88  
1. Broader possibilities with the right of access 
The requirement for notification prior to processing applies only to the 
notification duties (Art 13-14). In contrast, the right of access (Art 15) 
can be invoked at any time by the data subject, opening up the 
possibility of providing information available after a decision has been 
made (i.e. the reasons for a specific decision). Von Lewinski89 argues 
that Art 15 (1)(h) grants a quasi-right to explanation of the main reasons 
connected  to “meaningful information about the logic involved” which 
can be requested by the data subject after a decision has been made. 
Others argued that the information supplied via notification duties and 
the right of access is largely identical, meaning the right of access is 
similarly limited in terms of the scope of “meaningful information about 
the logic involved as well as the significance and the envisaged 
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 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, supra note 51 at 13. 
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 Franck, supra note 54 at Rn. 45-49. 
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 On the importance to inform the data subject accurately (e.g. risks, safeguards, 
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MORE HARMONISED INFORMATION PROVISIONS 29 (2004), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp100_en.pdf (last 
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 von Lewinski, DS-GVO ARTIKEL 22 AUTOMATISIERTE ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM 
EINZELFALL EINSCHLIEßLICH PROFILING BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR 
DATENSCHUTZRECHT Rn. 54 (Wolff & Brink eds., 21 ed. 2017) argues that Art 13(2)(f) 
and 14(2)(g) aim to inform about the outcome of a decision and that Art 15(1)(h) aims 
to inform about the main reasons, the logic and consequences of the decision. 
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consequences” (Art 15(1)(h)). Information can thus largely be provided 
with identical tools (e.g. generic icons, privacy statements)90 or generic 
templates91 used for both notification and in response to access requests.  
The narrower interpretation appears to be correct.92 The Article 
29 Working Party supports this view, explaining that the information 
requirements in Art 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h) are identical,93 while 
“Article 15 implies a more general form of oversight, rather than a right 
to an explanation of a particular decision.”94 A similar argument has 
been made by the ICO stating that Articles 13-15 aim to “provide 
information about how profiling might affect the data subject generally, 
rather than information about a specific decision.”95 The intention of Art 
15 is to provide a control mechanism for data subjects to request at any 
time more or less the same information as Art 13-14, without having to 
rely on legal compliance with the notification duties by data 
controllers.96 Many commentators also do not explicitly distinguish 
between types of information to be provided under Art 13-14 and Art 
15, suggesting that more detailed or personalised information is not 
required under the right of access.97 Reflecting this, much of Art 15 is 
identical in wording to Art 13-14. However, even with the overlap in 
wording, it must be noted that Art 12(7) - which states that a meaningful 
overview of the intended processing has to be provided at the latest at 
the time of the data collection - only refers to Art 13-14 and not Art 15. 
Further, Art 13-14 offer generic information for a broad audience (e.g. 
privacy statements on web pages), whereas requested information via 
Art 15 may need to be tailored according to the request of the user (e.g. 
to ask for confirmation of identity if in doubt (Art 12(6)). With that said, 
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the GDPR indicates a restricted scope for the right of access when 
compared to Art 13-14. Personal data of other data subjects must not be 
disclosed, as this could infringe their privacy. Access requests can also 
contravene trade secrets or intellectual property rights (Art 15(4) and 
Recital 63), meaning an appropriate balance between the data subject 
and controller’s interests must be struck.98  
2. Understanding through counterfactuals 
Counterfactual explanations both meet and exceed the aims and 
requirements of the GDPR’s transparency mechanisms (Art 12), 
notification duties (Art 13-14), and right of access (Art 15) which 
provide data subjects with understanding of the scope of automated 
decision-making. As argued above, Recital 71 does not give any clear 
indication of the intended purpose or content of explanations, including 
whether the internal logic of the algorithm must be explained. By 
providing simple ‘if-then’ statements, counterfactuals align with the 
requirement to communicate information to data subjects in a “concise, 
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form” (Art 12(1)). They 
simultaneously provide greater insight into the data subject’s personal 
situation and the reasons behind relevant automated decisions than an 
overview tailored to a general audience. Counterfactuals are also less 
likely to infringe on trade secrets or the rights and freedoms of others 
(e.g. privacy), since no data of other data subjects or detailed 
information about the algorithm needs to be disclosed, in line with 
restrictions on the right of access (Art 15(4) and Recital 63).  
Perhaps most importantly, counterfactuals offer an explanation 
of some of the rationale of specific automated decisions, without 
needing to explain the internal logic of how a decision was reached 
(beyond a specific, limited set of dependencies between variables and 
the decision). This type of information is in line with the guidance 
mentioned above from the Article 29 Working Party
99
 and the UK’s 
ICO.
100
 While opening the black box is not legally required, some 
information about the “logic involved” in automated decision-making 
must be provided (Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h)). Under the Data 
Protection Directive’s right of access, disclosing the algorithm’s source 
code, formula, weights, full set of variables, and information about 
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reference groups has generally not been required.101 The GDPR’s right 
of access is likely to present similar requirements. Counterfactuals 
largely follow this precedent by disclosing only the influence of select 
external facts and variables on a specific decision. Although Art 
13(2)(f), Art 14(2)(g), and Art 15(1)(h) do not require information about 
specific decisions (see section ‘Explanations to Understand Decisions’), 
counterfactuals represents a minimal form of disclosure to inform the 
data subject about the “logic involved” in specific decisions. This form 
of disclosure regulatory burden for data controllers is minimised, as 
resolving the technical difficulties of interpretability or explaining the 
internal logic of complex systems to non-experts is not required to 
compute and communicate counterfactual explanations. Counterfactuals 
can thus be recommended as a minimally burdensome and disruptive 
technique to help data subject’s understand the rationale of specific 
decisions beyond the explicit legal requirements of Art 13(2)(f), Art 
14(2)(g), and Art 15(1)(h). 
B. EXPLANATIONS TO CONTEST DECISIONS 
Another possible purpose of explanations is to provide information that 
helps contest automated decisions when an adverse or otherwise 
undesired decision is received. A right to contest decisions is provided 
as a safeguard against automated decision-making in Art 22(3).  
Contesting a decision can aim to reverse or nullify the decision and 
return to a status where no decision has been made, or to alter the result 
and receive an alternative decision. If the reasons that led to a decision 
have to be explained, the affected party can assess whether these reasons 
were legitimate and contest the assessment as required.  
How a decision can be contested depends on whether the 
safeguards in Art 22(3) (i.e. rights to obtain human intervention, express 
views, and contest the decision) are interpreted as a unit that must be 
invoked together, or as individual rights that can be invoked separately 
or in any possible combination.
102
 To gauge the scope of explanations 
according to their purpose and aim, different possible models for 
contesting an automated decision need to be assessed. 
Four models are possible. If the safeguards are a unit and must 
be invoked together, it is likely that some human involvement is 
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necessary to issue a new decision. This could either be a human making 
the decision without any algorithmic help, hence the new result is a 
human decision rather than an automated decision. Alternatively, a 
person could be required to make a decision taking the algorithmic 
assessment and/or the data subject’s objections into account, which 
would be human assessment with algorithmic elements. In both cases 
data subjects would lose their safeguards against the subsequent decision 
(Art 22 (3)), as both types of decision are not based “solely on 
automated processing” and thus do not meet the definition of automated 
individual decisions in Art 22(1). Another possibility is that a person 
could be required to monitor the input data and processing (e.g. based on 
the data subject’s objections), with a new decision made solely by the 
algorithmic system. In this case the Art 22(3) safeguards still apply to 
the new decision.103 
 Finally, if the safeguards can be separated, and data subjects can 
invoke their right to contest the decision without invoking their right to 
obtain human intervention or express their views, a new decision could 
be issued with no human involvement. This decision could be contested 
again under Art 22(3). Which of these models will be preferred 
following implementation of the GDPR is unclear.104 
The question remains what explanations are necessary or would 
be helpful to contest decisions. This will depend on the contesting 
model. The first model where a human makes a new decision and 
disregards everything the algorithm suggested, an explanation of the 
rationale of the original decision could be informative, but will not 
practically impact on the new decision made entirely by a human 
decision-maker. For each of the other models, where algorithmic 
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 However, if the new automated decision is communicated to the data subject by a 
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involvement is envisioned, an explanation of the rationale of the 
decision could be helpful to identify potential grounds for contesting, 
such as inaccuracies in the input data, problematic inferences, or other 
flaws in the algorithmic reasoning.105  
Even though an explanation of the rationale of a decision could 
be helpful, it does not imply an explanation is required by the GDPR, or 
is the intended aim of the non-binding right to explanation (Recital 71). 
Recital 71 does not specify the aim of the right or what information 
should be revealed, and does not explicitly require the algorithm’s 
internal logic to be explained. An explicit link is not made with the right 
to explanation serving as a basis for a right to contest,106 not the least 
because the safeguards in Art 22(3) could be seen as independent from 
each other.  Therefore, explanations under Recital 71 are not a necessary 
precondition to contest unfavourable decisions, even though this might 
be helpful. 
Similarly, an explicit link has not been made between the right to 
contest and the transparency mechanisms (Art 12), notification duties 
(Art 13-14), right of access (Art 15), meaning the information provided 
through these rights and duties need not be explicitly tailored to help 
data subjects successfully contest decisions.107  
Nonetheless, information provided by Art 12-15 may be helpful 
for contesting. Support is evident in the fact that notification duties aim 
to facilitate the exercise of other rights in the GDPR (Art 12(2)) to 
increase individual control over personal data processing. To achieve 
this, Articles 13(2)(b), 14(2)(c) and 15(1)(e) obligate data controllers to 
inform data subjects about their rights (Art 15-21)108 at the time when 
the data is collected (Art 13), within one month when obtained from a 
third party (Art 14), or at any time if requested by the data subject (Art 
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15). However, Art 22 appears not to be covered by these provisions due 
to the odd phrasing of the obligation to inform of ‘the existence of 
automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 
22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about 
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject’.  
As argued above, Art 13-15 will provide a meaningful overview 
of automated decision-making tailored to a general audience. On the 
surface, such an overview is not immediately useful for contesting 
decisions, as information about the rationale of individual decisions is 
not provided. In describing information to be provided about automated 
decision-making, these Articles explicitly refer only to Art 22(1) and 
(4). It follows that data subjects do not need to be informed about the 
safeguards against automated decision-making such as the right to 
contest (Art 22 (3)).109 This limitation is telling. If the aim of Art 13-15 
were to facilitate contesting decisions by providing useful, individual-
level information, one would expect the right to contest or Art 22(3) to 
be explicitly discussed. Similarly, Art 13-15 seem not required to inform 
the data subject about their right not to be subject to an automated 
individual decision (Art 22(1)), from which a right to contest decisions 
could be inferred.110 In fact, in an earlier draft of the GDPR it was 
suggested that the information rights should refer to Art 20 as a 
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 Schulz, supra note 38 at Rn. 33-37 argues that data controllers only have to inform 
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decisions. 
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whole.111 Ultimately, this approach was not adopted, suggesting that the 
lack useful information for contesting decisions was intentional. 
This lack of an explicit link to the safeguards against automated 
decision-making is in many ways unsurprising. Art 12-15 have the aim 
to inform data subjects about the existence of their rights in the 
GDPR,112 and to facilitate their exercise.113  This does not, however, 
mean that the controller is required to provide other information to help 
the data subject to exercise her rights.114 Rather, the data subject only 
needs to be informed about the existence of her rights, and provided 
with the necessary infrastructure for their exercise115 (e.g. web portals 
for complaints), including the elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic 
hurdles,116 a guarantee of reasonable response time to queries lodged117 
(Art 12(3)), and the opportunity to interact with someone who has the 
power to change the decision.118 However, the data subject remains 
responsible to exercise her rights independently.119 As one commentator 
notes, Art 15 does not create a duty to legal consultancy;120 rather, it is 
sufficient that the data controllers inform about the existing rights in the 
GDPR. Unfortunately, Recital 60, which vaguely states that “any further 
information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing taking 
into account the specific circumstances and context in which the 
personal data are processed” should be provided to the data subject, does 
not offer additional assistance to the data subject. This provision was 
intentionally moved to the non-binding Recitals during trilogue 
negotiations.121 Data controllers thus do not have a legal obligation to 
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provide information that will be particularly useful for the data subject 
to exercise her other rights.  
One final comparable restriction is notable concerning Art 16, 
the right for the data subject to rectify inaccurate personal data. Data 
controllers are not required to specify which records most influenced a 
specific automated decision, which could be extremely helpful to a data 
subject attempting to identify inaccuracies as grounds to contest a 
decision. If large amounts of personal data are held, then the subject may 
have to check tens of thousands of items for inaccuracies.  
1. Contesting through counterfactuals 
Art 13-15 thus do little to facilitate a data subject’s ability to 
challenge automated decisions. Information is not provided about the 
safeguards in Art 22(3) (e.g. the right to contest). It appears that data 
subjects do not need to be informed of their right not to be subject to an 
automated decision, which itself could imply a right to contest 
objectionable automated decisions. Similarly, Recital 71 has neither an 
explicit link to contesting decisions nor to understanding the black box. 
Even though an explanation could be helpful, they do not appear to be 
intended as a precondition for challenging decisions. If explanations 
were a precondition for contesting decisions, they would appear in the 
legally binding text.  To offer greater protection to data subjects, these 
information gaps should be closed, meaning data controllers should 
inform about the right not to be subject to an automated decision and its 
safeguards. However, each of these seemingly intentional limitations on 
the information provided to data subjects suggest that information about 
the internal logic of an automated decision-making system (in 
compliance with “meaningful information about the logic involved as 
well as the significance and the envisaged consequences” in Articles 
13(2)(4), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h)), which could facilitate contesting 
decisions, does not need to be provided.  
Given these restrictions, counterfactuals could be helpful for 
contesting decisions, and thus provide greater protection for the data 
subject than currently envisioned by the GDPR. Regardless of the legal 
status of the right to explanation, the right to contest is a legally binding 
                                                                                                                  
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last visited Nov 10, 2016); 
EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS, supra note 114 at 126–127, 129. However, this proposal 
was not adopted and moved to Recital 60, suggesting that there is no legal duty to 
provide more information than required in Art 13-14; see Franck, supra note 57 at Rn. 
27-28. 
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safeguard (Art 22(3)). By providing information about the external 
factors and key variables that contributed to a specific decision, 
counterfactuals can provide valuable information for data subjects to 
exercise their right to contest. This would also be in line with the 
guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party, which urge that 
understanding decisions and knowing their legal basis is essential for 
contesting decisions, and is not necessarily linked to opening the black 
box.122 An explanation that low-income led to a loan application being 
declined could, for example, help the data subject contest the outcome 
on the grounds of inaccurate or incomplete data regarding her financial 
situation. Understanding the internal logic of the system that led to 
income being considered a relevant variable in the decision, which 
would require a technical explanation unlike a counterfactual 
explanation (see Appendix 1), may be desirable in its own right, but is 
not absolutely necessary to contest the decision based on that variable. 
Counterfactuals offer a solution and support for contesting 
decisions by providing data subjects with information about the reasons 
for a decision, without the need to open the black box. Although Art. 16 
of the GDPR gives the data subject the right to correct inaccurate data 
used to make a decision, the data subject does not need to be informed 
which data the decision depended. Where a large corpus of data has 
been collected, an individual without knowledge of which data is 
relevant or most influential on a particular decision is forced to vet all of 
it. This lack of information increases the burden on data subjects seeking 
a different outcome. Counterfactuals provide a compact and easy way to 
convey these dependencies (i.e. which data was influential), and to 
facilitate effective claims that a decision was made on the basis of 
inaccurate data and contest it. 
C. EXPLANATIONS TO ALTER FUTURE DECISIONS 
From the view of the data subject, alongside understanding and 
contesting decisions, explanations can also be useful to indicate what 
could be changed to receive a desired result in the future. This purpose 
does not necessarily relate to the right to contest. Accurate decisions can 
produce unfavourable results for the data subject. The chances of 
successfully challenging the decision will also be low in some cases, or 
the costs and effort required too high. In these situations, the data 
subject may prefer to change aspects of her situation by adapting her 
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behaviour, and requesting a new decision once more favourable 
conditions exist.  
Using explanations as a guide to altering behaviour to receive a 
desired automated decision is not directly addressed in the GDPR. This 
does not, however, undermine the interest data subjects have in 
receiving desired results from automated decision-making systems. For 
example, if a subject was rejected for a loan due to insufficient income, 
a counterfactual explanation will indicate if reapplying in the event of an 
immediate pay rise is reasonable. The Article 29 Working Party seems 
to agree, stating in relevant guidelines that “tips on how to improve 
these habits and consequently how to lower insurance premiums” could 
be useful for the data subject.123 For reasons outlined in Appendix 1, 
technical explanations that try to provide “meaningful information about 
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences [italics added]” of automated decision-making are not 
guaranteed to be useful in this situation.  
Counterfactuals can thus be useful for altering future decisions in 
favour of the data subject. By providing information about key variables 
and “close possible worlds” which result in a different decision, data 
subjects can understand which factors could be changed to receive the 
desired result. For decision-making models and environments with low 
variability over time, or models that are ‘artificially frozen’ in time for 
individuals (i.e. future decisions will be made with the same model as 
the individual’s original decision), this information can help the data 
subject to alter her behaviour or situation to receive their desired result 
in the future.  
With that said, unanticipated dependencies between intentionally 
changed attributes and other variables, such as an increase in income 
resulting from a change in career, may undermine the utility of 
counterfactuals as guides for future behaviour. Counterfactual 
explanations can, however, address the impact of changes to more than 
one variable on a model’s output at the same time. Further, regardless of 
the utility of counterfactuals as guidance for future behaviour, their 
ability to help individuals understand which data and variables were 
influential in specific prior decisions remains unaffected. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a novel lightweight form of explanation that we refer 
to as counterfactual explanations. Unlike existing approaches that try to 
provide insight into the internal logic of black-box algorithms, 
counterfactual explanations do not attempt to clarify how decisions are 
made internally. Instead, they provide insight into which external facts 
could be different in order to arrive at a desired outcome.
124
 Importantly, 
counterfactual explanations are efficiently computable for many 
standard classifiers, particularly neural networks.  As our new form of 
explanation significantly differs from existing works, we have justified 
its nature as an explanation with reference to previous works in the 
philosophical literature and early A.I. 
From the view of the data subject, we have assessed three 
purposes of explanations of automated decisions: understanding, 
contesting and altering. We compared these aims with the provisions of 
the GDPR and evaluated if they rely upon opening the black box. We 
concluded that the framework offers little support to achieve these goals, 
and does not mandate that algorithms are explainable to understand, 
contest or alter decisions.  
The GDPR itself provides little insight into the intended purpose 
and content of explanations. Recital 71, the only provision that explicitly 
mentions explanations, does not reveal their intended purpose or 
content. Given the final text of the GDPR, it appears that explanations 
can voluntary be offered after decisions have been made, and are not a 
required precondition to contest decisions, Further, there is no clear link 
that suggests that explanations under Recital 71 require opening the 
black box. 
Recognising this relative lack of insight into explanations, 
related provisions addressing automated decision-making were 
examined. Notification duties defined in Art 13-14 apply prior to data 
processing or before a decision is made (i.e. at the time of data 
collection), and provide a simple and generic overview of intended data 
processing activities that aims to inform a general audience (Art 12 (7)). 
This type of “meaningful overview” of automated decision-making is 
largely unsuitable to understand the rationale of specific decisions. Art 
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 The method described here is compatible with a proposal made by Citron and 
Pasquale to allow consumers to manually enter “hypothetical alterations” to their credit 
histories and view their effects. See: DANIELLE KEATS CITRON & FRANK A. PASQUALE, 
THE SCORED SOCIETY: DUE PROCESS FOR AUTOMATED PREDICTIONS (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2376209 (last visited Mar 4, 2017). 
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13-14 similarly do not facilitate contesting decisions, owing to a lack of 
information to be provided about the right not to be subject to automated 
individual decision-making (Art 22(1)), and its safeguards (Art 22(3)). 
The right of access (Art 15) provides nearly identical information to Art 
13-14, and is thus offers similarly limited value for understanding and 
contesting decisions. The rights and freedoms of others (e.g. privacy or 
trade secrets) which are protected in Art 15(4) and Recital 63 pose an 
additional barrier to transparency when access requests are lodged. 
Across each of these Articles, technical explanations of the internal logic 
of automated decision-making systems are not legally mandated. 
Finally, offering explanations to give guidance how to receive the 
desired result in the future does not appear to be an aim of the GDPR, 
but could still be highly useful for individuals seeking alternative, more 
desirable outcomes. 
Any future attempt to implement a legally binding right to 
explanation as a safeguard against automated decision-making within 
the framework provided by the GDPR faces several notable challenges. 
Automated decision-making must be based “solely on automated 
processing,” and have “legal effects” or similarly significant effects (Art 
22(1)). Additionally, exemptions from the safeguards against automated 
decision-making can be introduced through Member State law (Art 
23).125 
However, the data subject’s desire to understand, contest, and 
alter decisions does not change based on these definitional issues. We 
therefore propose to move past the limitation of the GDPR and to use 
counterfactuals as unconditional explanations. These unconditional 
explanations should be given whenever requested, regardless of outcome 
(positive or negative decision), whether the decision was based on solely 
automated processes and their (legal or similar significant) effects.  
Counterfactual explanations could be implemented in several 
ways. The transience of decision-making models suggests that 
counterfactuals either need to be computed automatically at the time a 
decision is made, or a copy of the model archived to compute 
counterfactuals at a later time. As multiple outcomes based on changes 
to multiple variables may be possible, a diverse set of counterfactual 
explanations should be provided, corresponding to different choices of 
nearby possible worlds for which the counterfactual holds. These sets 
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could be disclosed when automated decision-making occurs, or in 
response to specific requests lodged by individuals or a trusted third 
party auditor.
126
 In any case, disclosures should occur in a reasonable 
window of time (e.g. Art 12(3)).  
Future research should determine appropriate distance metrics 
and requirements for a sufficient and relevant set of counterfactuals 
across use sectors and cases which have very different needs. While 
prior philosophical debate may prove helpful, the absence of causal 
models in most modern classifiers, as well as the preferences of the 
recipient(s) of the set, must be accounted for in choosing appropriate 
metrics and requirements. Compared to prior discussion of measuring 
“closest possible worlds,” setting requirements for appropriate “close 
possible worlds” represents a very different philosophical, social, and 
legal challenge. 
To minimise bureaucratic burdens for data controllers and delays 
for data subjects and third party auditors, automated calculation and 
disclosure of counterfactuals would be preferable. We recommend this 
type of automated implementation going forward. One possible 
approach is to provide individuals or third party auditors with access to 
‘auditing APIs’,127 which allow users to request counterfactual 
explanations from the service provider, and perhaps compute them 
directly via the API. Access to (historical) decision-making models used 
for the decision at hand, as well as permissive terms of service that 
allow for such auditing, would be required.128 This functionality could 
potentially be embedded in existing APIs.  
Counterfactual explanations provide reasons why a particular 
decision was received (e.g. low income), offer grounds to contest it (e.g. 
if the data controller used inaccurate data about the income of the 
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 Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi, supra note 1. 
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 Who would shoulder the costs of hosting these APIs and computing counterfactuals 
is an important political issue that would require resolution. This issue goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. For related discussion of implementing algorithmic auditing, see: 
Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing algorithms: Research methods for detecting 
discrimination on internet platforms,  DATA DISCRIM. CONVERT. CRIT. CONCERNS 
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applicant), and provide limited ‘advice’ on how to receive the desired 
results in the future (e.g. an increase of 4000 pounds/ year would have 
resulted in a positive application). Their usage would help to resolve two 
primary objections to a legally binding right to explanation: first, that 
explaining the internal logic of automated systems to experts and non-
experts alike is a highly difficult and perhaps intractable challenge; and 
second, that an excessive disclosure of information about the internal 
logic of a system could infringe on the rights of others, either by 
revealing protected trade secrets or by violating the privacy of 
individuals whose data is contained in the training dataset. In contrast, 
counterfactuals allow an individual to receive explanations without 
conveying the internal logic of the algorithmic black box (beyond a 
limited set of dependencies), and are less likely to infringe the rights and 
freedoms of others than full disclosure. Assuming reasonable limitations 
are set on the number of counterfactuals that must be provided, 
counterfactuals are also less likely to provide information that reveals 
trade secrets or allows gaming of decision-making systems. 
As a minimal form of explanation, counterfactuals are not 
appropriate in all scenarios. In particular, where it is important to 
understand system functionality, or the rationale of an automated 
decision, counterfactuals may be insufficient in themselves. Further, 
counterfactuals do not provide the statistical evidence needed to assess 
algorithms for fairness or racial bias. Given these limitations, more 
general forms of explanations and interpretability should still be pursued 
to increase accountability and better validate the fairness and 
functionality of systems.  
However, counterfactuals represent an easy first step that 
balances transparency, explainability, and accountability with other 
interests such as minimising the regulatory burden on business interest 
or preserving the privacy of others, while potentially increasing public 
acceptance of automatic decisions. Rather than waiting years for 
jurisprudence to dissolve all these uncertainties, we propose to abandon 
the narrow definitions and conditions the GDPR imposes on automated 
decision-making, and offer counterfactuals as unconditional 
explanations at the request of affected individuals.  
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APPENDIX 1: SIMPLE LOCAL MODELS AS EXPLANATIONS 
As discussed in section ‘Explanations in A.I. and Machine Learning’, 
approaches such as LIME129 that generating simple models as local 
approximations of decisions make a three-way trade-off between the 
quality of the approximation vs. the ease of understanding the function 
and the size of the domain for which the approximation is valid.130 
To illustrate the instabilities of the approach with respect to the 
size of the domain, we consider a simple function of one variable.  Even 
for problems such as this the notion of scale, or how large a region 
should an explanation try to describe is challenging, with the ideal 
choice of scale depending on what the explanation would be used for. 
As a real-world example, consider being stopped by someone in 
a car who asks which direction they should travel in to go north. 
Fundamentally, this is a difficult question to answer well, with the most 
appropriate answer depending upon how far north they wish to travel. If 
they do not intend to travel far, simply pointing north gives them enough 
information, however, if they intend to travel further, roads that initially 
point north may double back on themselves or be cul-de-sacs and better 
directions are needed. If they intend to travel a long way, they may be 
better off ignoring the compass bearing entirely, and instead try to 
directly join up with an inter-city network. 
This exact issue is faced when automating explanations of 
decisions: the generated explanations are generic, and designed to be 
useful to the recipient of the explanation regardless of how they are 
used. However, as shown in figure 1, the explanation -- or simplified 
model-- can vary wildly with the scale or range of inputs considered. 
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Figure 1 - Local models varying with choice of scale. The red line in 
each subfigure shows a local approximation of the same blue score 
curve centred at the same location in each plot. The varying range over 
which the approximation is computed is given by the region marked by 
black bars. Different choices of range e.g. top left vs. bottom left can 
lead to completely opposing explanations where the score either 
increases or decreases as the value along the bottom axis increase. 
As can be seen, the direction and magnitude of the linear approximation 
(red) to underlying function (blue) vary dramatically with choice of 
domain, and deciding which approximation is most helpful to a 
layperson trying to understand the decision made about them is non-
trivial.  
To show the difficulties that would exist in either trying to use 
local models to either compute counterfactuals, or simply for the data 
subject to adjust their score, we assume that the subject desired to know 
how to obtain a lower score of -10 or below. In this case, none of the 
local approximations would be useful. The top left model, which is 
based on exact description of the function around point x predicts that a 
score of -10 would be obtained with a value of -2.5 -- corresponding to 
an actual score of 91.5, while the two centre approximations suggest that 
it is not possible to obtain any score except 0, and the bottom left 
approximation says that -10 occurs at near 0.9 - which actually 
corresponds to a local maxima. 
In contrast, the counterfactual explanation for a query such as 
“Why was the score not below -10?” would return the answer “Because 
the x value was not 2.15” (the counterfactual is illustrated in figure 2 by 
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the green dot). Of course, it should be noted that the two approaches are 
generally incomparable. In much the same way, if a data subject desired 
to know a local linear approximation about their data point, knowledge 
of counterfactuals would not be helpful. However, of the two 
approaches, counterfactuals are the only one that will provide some 
indication if it is worth reapplying for a loan in the event of a pay rise. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Visual representation of the range of a counterfactual 
explanation 
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APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE TRANSPARENCY INFOGRAPHIC 
The figure below shows several icons proposed by the European 
Parliament during trilogue that were ultimately not adopted as a 
standard. It gives an example of the level of complexity expected in an 
explanation to a data subject. 
 
 
